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INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES 
AND VICTIMS OF STATE-SPONSORED DOPING 
FARAZ SHAHLAEI 
The Russian State-sponsored doping scandal shocked the world of 
sports, yet from the international law perspective raises issues concerning 
the international responsibility of States. Whether States can administer 
such programs with little cost or should be responsible for their wrongful 
acts is the subject of this research.  This article discusses how the 
international law of State responsibility applies to the case of State-
sponsored doping and analyzes how countries who are involved in 
systematic doping programs are responsible under international law 
principles. The article concludes that individual athletes are the victims 
of this international wrongful act and therefore should be compensated 
for both material and moral damages. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In July 2016, the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) released its 
first independent report on allegations of State-sponsored doping by 
Russia during the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics in which it confirmed 
that Russian officials were conducting a wide scale doping program. 1  
The second report extended the time span of this systematic doping and 
declared that Russia had hijacked the international sports for years.2   
Subsequent investigations instructed by the Disciplinary Committee 
of the International Olympic Committee, known as Schmid Commission, 
confirmed the findings of previous reports and reaffirmed the systematic 
and institutionalized governmental involvement in the doping program.3 
Part of the outcome was a chaos in the medal rankings; due to doping 
violations, Russia initially lost thirteen medals at 2014 Sochi Winter 
Games.4 This turmoil sparked a re-analysis of doping samples from the 
London 2012 and Beijing 2008 Games, the results of which also toppled 
  
 1. Richard H. McLaren, WADA Investigation of Sochi Allegations – Part I, 
WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY BY INDEP. PERSON, 1 (July 18, 2016), https://www.wada-
ama.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/20160718_ip_report_newfinal.pdf [hereinafter 
First Report]. 
 2. Richard H. McLaren, WADA Independent Investigation Report – Part II, 
WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY BY INDEP. PERSON, 74 (Dec. 9, 2016), https://www.wada-
ama.org/en/resources/doping-control-process/mclaren-independent-investigation-report-
part-ii [hereinafter Second Report]. 
 3. IOC Disciplinary Commission’s Report to the IOC Executive Board, INT’L 
OLYMPICS COMMITTEE, 24–26 (Dec. 2, 2017), 
https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/IOC/Who-We-
Are/Commissions/Disciplinary-Commission/IOC-DC-Schmid/IOC-Disciplinary-
Commission-Schmid-Report.pdf#_ga=2.104879233.385687857.1513014269-
1584169185.1502791100 [hereinafter Schmid Report]. 
 4. See Nick Zaccardi, List of Russia Olympic medals stripped; new Sochi 
medals standings, NBC SPORTS (Nov. 27, 2017, 3:09 PM), 
http://olympics.nbcsports.com/2017/11/27/sochi-olympic-medal-standings-russia-medals-
stripped-doping/; However, the Court of Arbitration for Sports reinstated seven of the 
thirteen medals before the 2018 PyeongChang Olympic games and lifted the ban on some 
of the athletes. See Media Release: The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) Delivers its 
Decisions in the Matter of 39 Russian Athletes v. The IOC: 28 Appeals Upheld, 11 
Partially Upheld, CAS (Feb. 1, 2018), http://www.tas-
cas.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Media_Release__decision_RUS_IOC_.pdf. 
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the podiums5 and hit some big names in the history of the Olympics.6  
Investigations revealed that between 2012 and 2015, Russia used the so-
called “Disappearing Positive Methodology” on 643 positive samples.7 
Athletes in thirty different sports have benefited from disappearing 
methodology whereas Athletics and weightlifting were by far the most 
benefited sports.8 
If States are able to support illicit doping programs on an extensive 
scale with little cost, the whole competition and the principles of the 
Olympic movement and sportsmanship are at risk.  In the words of the 
Independent Investigator: “The allegations, which we find to have been 
established, attack the principle of clean sport and clean athletes which 
are at the very heart of WADA’s raison d’etre.”9 By seeing this situation 
other countries may be lured into such activities, creating a controversial 
situation that threatens sport in its entirety.10 This rippling effect 
  
 5. See, e.g., Reanalysis Reveals Banned Substances in 23 “A” Samples From 
London 2012, INT’L OLYMPIC COMMITTEE (May 27, 2016), 
https://www.olympic.org/news/reanalysis-reveals-banned-substances-in-23-a-samples-
from-london-2012; See Weightlifter set for 2012 Olympic bronze despite finishing ninth, 
BBC NEWS (Sept. 15, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/sport/olympics/37371735 (Just one 
group of weightlifting in London Games (men’s -94kg) shows the depth of drama when 
six weightlifters including all three medalists failed retests that raised fifth, eighth, and 
ninth ranked weightlifters to Olympic medals four years after the games.); See IOC 
Sanctions Eight Athletes for Failing Anti-Doping Test at London 2012, INT’L OLYMPIC 
COMMITTEE (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.olympic.org/news/ioc-sanctions-eight-athletes-
for-failing-anti-doping-test-at-london-2012 (Following the retests, Kazakhstan lost a total 
of nine medals from the 2008 and 2012 games. Kazakhstan experienced its most 
successful Olympic appearance in London, with seven gold medals, and was suddenly 
stripped of three gold medals.); See also Olzhas Auyezov, Weightlifting: Kazakhstan’s 
Ilyin denies doping charges, REUTERS (June 16, 2016), 
http://ca.reuters.com/article/sportsNews/idCAKCN0Z20ZO; See also Public Disclosures, 
INT’L WEIGHTLIFTING FED’N (July 15, 2016), http://www.iwf.net/2016/06/15/public-
disclosures/.  
 6. Karolos Grohmann, Doping – IOC strips three more medals from 2008, 2012 
Games re-tests, REUTERS (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-doping-
olympics-idUSKBN17726B.  
 7. First Report, supra note 1, at 39. 
 8. Id. at 41. 
 9. Id. at 22.  
 10. See Sean Ingle, Russia’s backdoor Olympics, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 2, 2018), 
https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2018/feb/02/winter-olympics-russian-doping-ban-
pyeongchang#img-1 (A British Member of the International Olympic Committee warned: 
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undermines sports’ potential for promoting peace and friendship among 
people and nations.11   
State-sponsored doping in sports is reminiscent of State-sponsored 
terrorism in the world of politics, with similar consequences such as a 
sense of insecurity and fear in their respective environments. While the 
problem of State-sponsored terrorism was the subject of attention for the 
international community,12 nevertheless the first investigated case of 
State-sponsored doping13 remained unnoticed from the international law 
perspective. This paper demonstrates that international law can have a 
supportive role in the realm of sports. 
In the modern structure of international sports, clean athletes deserve 
particular attention as a vulnerable group against doping and other 
corrupted practices that put their fundamental human rights at risk.14 
Recognizing State responsibility in the case of running a State doping 
machine provides a mechanism for access to justice for the victims of 
systematic doping and also acts as a deterrent for other countries.15 
Moreover, the position of sport governing bodies in imposing its goals 
  
“Athletes now think that you are better off cheating or getting your nation to establish a 
doping system because even if it is discovered, the consequences are minimal . . . [o]r, if 
you don’t want to cheat, avoid elite sport like the plague.”). 
 11. Human Rights Council Res. 31/23, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/L.29, at 1 (Mar. 21, 
2016).  
 12. See, e.g., International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999, 2178 U.N.T.S 197; See also G.A. Res. 67/234B (Apr. 2, 2013), 
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/2013/04/20130410%2012- 
01%20PM/Ch_XXVI_08.pdf; See also Cindy Whang, The Challenges of Enforcing 
International Military-Use Technology Export Control Regimes: An Analysis of the 
United Nations Arms Trade Treaty, 33 WIS. INTL. L.J. 114 (2015). 
 13. Cody Benjamin, Russia banned from 2018 Winter Olympics by IOC over 
widespread doping, CBS SPORTS (Dec. 5, 2017), 
https://www.cbssports.com/olympics/news/ioc-bans-russia-from-2018-winter-olympics-
over-doping-scandal/.  
 14. See generally Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo), 
Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. Rep. 347, ¶ 43 (June 19) (Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado 
Trindade). 
 15. DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 22 
(Oxford University Press, 3d ed. 2015). 
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and conditions on sovereign governments16 can help in diminishing the 
traditional criticism of enforcement in international law.17   
This article brings to the forefront an important intersection between 
international law and sports. Based on the following analysis, States that 
systematically support doping are responsible for their wrongdoings18 
and subsequently are under an obligation to provide compensation for the 
damages resulting from their wrongful conduct.19 It briefly examines the 
evolution of the law of international state responsibility20, applies the 
rules to the facts in this doping case21, and concludes that clean athletes, 
as the main beneficiaries of the legal anti-doping framework, should be 
compensated for material and moral damages.22 
II. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES 
Codification of State responsibility, as the last area of international 
law to undergo such an evolution,23 was a significant movement, 
especially after more than half a century of being on agenda in 
international law.24 The adoption of the Draft Articles on Responsibility 
of States for Internationally Wrongful Conducts25 by the International 
Law Commission in its 53
rd
 session in 2001 was the apogee of these 
  
 16. See, e.g., Henk Erik Meier & Borja Garcia, Protecting Private Transnational 
Authority Against Public Intervention: FIFA’s Power Over National Governments, 93 
PUB. ADMIN. 890, 891 (2015). 
 17. ROBERT KOLB, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY: AN 
INTRODUCTION 231 (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017). 
 18. See infra Parts II, III.  
 19. See infra Part IV. 
 20. See infra Part I. 
 21. See infra Parts II, III. 
 22. See infra Parts IV, V. 
 23. David D. Caron, State Crimes: Looking at Municipal Experience with 
Organizational Crime, in INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TODAY ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF 
OSCAR SCHACHTER 23, 23 (Maurizio Ragazzi ed., 2005). 
 24. James Crawford, Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, U.N. AUDIOVISUAL LIBR. OF INT’L L., 1–2 (2012), 
http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/rsiwa/rsiwa_e.pdf.  
 25. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session (Draft 
articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts), U.N. Doc. 
A/56/10, ch. IV.E.1 (2001), http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ddb8f804.html [hereinafter 
Draft]. 
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efforts.26 This body of law is the result of efforts by five Special 
Rapporteurs, including almost thirty reports to International Law 
Commission, along with the submissions of the Drafting Committee and 
government comments.27  
Article 1 of the draft provides: “Every internationally wrongful act of 
a State entails the international responsibility of that State.”28 In order for 
an act to constitute internationally wrongful conduct, it should be 
attributable to the State under international law and should be a violation 
of international obligations of that State.29  
Based on this article, international responsibility is the consequence of 
any failure in complying with international obligations of a State 
committed by any of its organs.30 What forms the basis of this debate is a 
breach of an international obligation that is attributable to the State,31 
regardless of other factors such as mens rea or legal injury.32   
Therefore, realization of responsibility is rested upon two main 
elements:  the first involves wrongful conduct by a State against its 
international obligations, and second, the conduct should be attributable 
to the State.33 Thus, mental element or fault is not a precondition for the 
purpose of international responsibility34 and is excluded from the scope 
of the draft. Regardless of knowledge, purpose, recklessness or 
negligence, “it is only the act of the State that matters, independently of 
any intention.”35 Accordingly, once the violation is established, it does 
not matter if the obligation was owed to a single State, multiple other 
  
 26. See, e.g., KOLB, supra note 17, at 8–12, 27–30. 
 27. Crawford, supra note 24, at 1.  
 28. See Draft, supra note 25, art. 1. 
 29. Id. art. 2. 
 30. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. 
A/56/10, at 26 (2001), reprinted in JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND 
COMMENTARIES 94–95, para. 4 (Cambridge University Press, 2002) [hereinafter 
Commentary]. 
 31. Draft, supra note 25, art. 2. 
 32. Alain Pellet, The Definition of Responsibility in International Law, in THE 
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 3, 5–6 (James Crawford et al. eds., 2010); See 
also Commentary, supra note 30, art. 2, para. 9. 
 33. Commentary, supra note 30, art. 2, para. 9.  
 34. Id. art. 2, para. 3. 
 35. Id. art. 2, para. 10. 
346 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 27.2
  
States, or the international community as a whole.36 What matters next is 
that if under the rules of international law the wrongful act is imputable 
to a State, it then sparks a requirement for reparation.37 
This institution has a close relationship with other areas of 
international law, especially international peace and security. Some have 
called State responsibility the heart of international law or the 
constitution of the international community.38 What comes below in 
connection with the recent scandal in the world of sports demonstrates 
the central role of this body of law in the current international legal 
order. 
Law of international responsibility of States is developing fast, with 
an increasing importance in the jurisprudence of the international courts 
and tribunals.39 The case of State-sponsored doping can contribute in 
developing the law of international responsibility. This case is very 
straightforward in terms of identifying the elements of responsibility, like 
a puzzle that has been designed to fit the framework of international state 
responsibility.  
III. INTERNATIONAL WRONGFUL CONDUCT 
Whether State-sponsored doping is covered by the law of 
international State responsibility depends on whether such programs are 
the breach of an international obligation enforceable at the time of the 
international wrongful acts or not.40 Without having an international 
obligation and a violation, no responsibility is presumed.41 The question 
here is an assessment between “the legal ‘ought’ and the factual ‘is.’”42 
The existence of an international obligation and consequently a breach 
will be discussed below in the Russian doping case.43 
  
 36. Id. art. 1, para. 5. 
 37. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 778 (Cambridge University Press, 
6th ed. 2008).  
 38. Pellet, supra note 32, at 3. 
 39. G.A. Res. 71/133, ¶ 1 (Dec. 19, 2016).  
 40. See Draft, supra note 25, arts. 2(b) & 13. 
 41. See infra Part IV.  
 42. KOLB, supra note 17, at 35. 
 43. See infra Part II.A–B.   
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A. An International Obligation 
In illustrating international responsibility, the first step is to analyze if 
there is an international legal obligation enforceable at the time of the 
breach.44 The source of the obligation embraces both treaty and non-
treaty obligations.45 States can be responsible for breaches of minor or 
egregious obligations whether owed to multiple States or to the 
international community as a whole.46 For example, a State can be 
responsible if there is a violation of preemptory norms of international 
human rights for which it has not ratified a treaty, but there is a presumed 
obligation to respect those rules.47 
The point of departure for identifying the international obligation in 
the case of Russian State-sponsored doping is shared between two main 
documents. The International Convention against Doping in Sport48 
(Convention) adopted by United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the World Anti-Doping Agency 
Code49 (WADA Code) are two prongs of this debate, containing 
international obligations for member States, including Russia, who has 
ratified the former50 and is bound by the rules and regulations of the 
latter.51 Hence, the roots of obligations in this doping case are mainly 
obligatory texts.   
The convention is a multilateral document with 187 members52 where 
the signatories accept commitments against other member States.53 Each 
  
 44. KOLB, supra note 17, at 36. 
 45. See also Commentary, supra note 30, art. 2, para. 7. 
 46. Id. art. 12, para. 6. 
 47. Draft, supra note 25, ch. III, art. 12, cmt. 3.  
 48. International Convention Against Doping in Sport, Oct. 19, 2005, 201 
U.N.T.S. 2419 [hereinafter Convention]. 
 49. WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE 16 (Jan. 1, 2015), 
https://www.wada-ama.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/wada_anti-
doping_code_2018_english_final.pdf [hereinafter WADA Code]. 
 50. International Convention Against Doping in Sport, UNESCO, 
http://www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO=31037&language=E (last visited Jan. 
4, 2019) (lists the member states who have ratified or accepted the Convention, and 
Russia ratified it on December 29, 2006).  
 51. Convention, supra note 48, art. 4(1)(2). 
 52. International Convention Against Doping in Sport, supra note 50.  
 53. Convention, supra note 48, art. 3. 
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Member State is bound to respect the provisions of the treaty.54  The 
Convention, among other things, provides that: “[i]n abiding by the 
obligations contained in this Convention, each State Party undertakes to 
adopt appropriate measures. Such measures may include legislation, 
regulation, policies or administrative practices”55 in order to achieve the 
purpose of the convention.56 
Parties to the UNESCO Convention are required to obey multiple 
obligations, including full compliance with WADA regulations,57 
international cooperation in order to achieve the purpose of the 
convention,58 compliance with internationally recognized ethical 
practices in conducting doping researches,59 taking measures against 
athlete support personnel who violate doping rules or who commit other 
offences connected to doping in sports,60 assisting sport and anti-doping 
organizations to implement doping control in their jurisdiction consistent 
with the WADA code,61 and facilitating doping control.62    
The obligations created under WADA Code can be explained as 
institutional obligations that, although “their legal force derives from a 
treaty, these obligations remain legally independent from the treaty.”63 
The WADA Code was in one sense an inspiration for the Convention—
to incorporate a governmental force in the global fight against doping64—
and an inevitable part of the legal regime created by the Convention.65  
  
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. art. 5. 
 56. Id. art. 3. 
 57. Id. art. 3(a).  
 58. Id. arts. 5, 13, 16. 
 59. Id. art. 25(a). 
 60. Id. art. 9.  
 61. Id. art. 12(a). 
 62. Id. art. 12. 
 63. Constantin P. Economides, Content of the Obligation: Obligations of Means 
and Obligations of Result, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 371, 372 
(James Crawford et al. eds., 2010). 
 64. See PAUL DAVID, A GUIDE TO THE WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE 3–6 
(Cambridge University Press, 2008); See also Convention, supra note 48, at 1. “Bearing 
in mind the World Anti-Doping Code adopted by the World Anti-Doping Agency at the 
World Conference on Doping in Sport. . . .” Id. 
 65. Convention, supra note 48, art. 4(1). 
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The Convention in many parts relies on the framework of the WADA 
Code.66   
These obligations were in force at the time when Russia’s systematic 
doping program manipulated the results of international tournaments and 
consequently meet the requirements for the establishment of a wrongful 
act.67 The Russian Federation ratified the Convention on December 2006 
and hence obliged itself by its rules and regulations.68 Furthermore, by 
signing an agreement in 2006, the Russian Sport Ministry, on behalf of 
the Russian government, accepted obligations for strict application of 
WADA code and Anti-Doping rules during the Sochi Games.69 
Therefore, the Convention and the Code simultaneously provide Russia 
with treaty-based obligations owed to multiple countries and at the same 
time the agreement creates commitments against international 
organizations such as IOC and WADA. These provisions were in force 
during the time of administering a State-run doping program, thus 
creating an international obligation to be respected by Russia. 
B. Breach 
The outcome of the investigations regarding the allegations of State-
sponsored doping will likely establish that Russia has violated its 
international obligations with respect to the international doping 
regulations. The draft articles provide a definition for breach of an 
international obligation: “There is a breach of an international obligation 
by a State when an act of that State is not in conformity with what is 
required of it by that obligation, regardless of its origin or character.”70 A 
breach can be in the form of an act or omission.71 “For example, the 
obligation under a treaty to enact a uniform law is breached by the failure 
  
 66. See, e.g., id. art. 2 (definitions), art. 3(1) (complying with the principles of the 
Code), art. 11(c) (complying with financial principles of the Code), art.12(a), art. 
16(a)(f)(g), art. 20, and art. 27(a)(b). 
 67. Draft, supra note 25, art. 13. 
 68. See generally International Convention against Doping in Sport, UNESCO, 
http://www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO=31037&language=E1.  
 69. Schmid Report, supra note 3, at 6. 
 70. Draft, supra note 25, art. 12. 
 71. See id. art. 2. 
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to enact the law, and it is not necessary for another State party to point to 
any specific damage it has suffered by reason of that failure.”72  
The UNESCO Convention is a “composite’ obligation’” under the 
conditions of Article 15 of the Draft, which requires a systematic 
response and policy making:73 a systematic State-fueled doping program 
is a ‘composite breach’ within the scope the same article.74 These 
composite obligations and breaches encompass some of the most serious 
wrongful acts in international law.75 The acts or omissions independently 
constitute a breach but they might also be part of a bigger picture that 
establishes a different wrongful act.76   
Generally, this doping scheme in all aspects is in conflict with 
provisions of the Convention and the Code. For instance, formulating a 
mouth-used doping cocktail and distributing it among athletes is an 
egregious breach of Article 8(1) of the Convention.77 The whole doping 
program is an obvious contravention of the provisions of Article 7 in 
“ensur[ing] the application of the Convention, notably through domestic 
coordination.”78 Inconsistencies in Russia regarding proper legislative 
measures to comply with the Code have been confirmed.79 The second 
report also enumerates the violations based on the WADA Code and its 
provisions.80   
  
 72. Commentary, supra note 30, art. 2, para. 9. 
 73. Id. art. 15, para. 3; See also KOLB, supra note 17, at 50–51. 
 74. Commentary, supra note 30, art. 15, paras. 1, 2. 
 75. Id. art. 15, para. 2. 
 76. KOLB, supra note 17, at 53. 
 77. See Convention, supra note 48, art. 8(1). “States Parties shall, where 
appropriate, adopt measures to restrict the availability of prohibited substances and 
methods in order to restrict their use in sport by athletes, unless the use is based upon a 
therapeutic use exemption. These include measures against trafficking to athletes and, to 
this end, measures to control production, movement, importation, distribution and sale.” 
Id.  
 78. Id. art. 7.  
 79. UNESCO, Anti-Doping Convention, Conference of Parties to the 
International Convention against Doping in Sport, Review of the National Anti-Doping 
Policy of the Russian Federation in the Context of the Policy Advice Project, paras. 49–
50, 52, ICDS/6CP/Doc.8 (Sep. 19, 2017) [hereinafter Convention Parties Conference].  
 80. See Second Report, supra note 2, at 46–48. 
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Although “a breach may exist even if the act of the State is only partly 
contrary to an international obligation incumbent upon it,”81 the scale of 
violations in the Russian doping case was so huge that the independent 
report recommended WADA declare the Moscow Accredited Laboratory 
non-compliant with the WADA Code.82 “Disappearing positive 
Methodology”83 was a practice directly in conflict with Russia’s 
obligations under both the Convention and the Code based on what was 
discussed regarding both documents.84  Divulgence of male DNA in two 
female hockey player urine samples85 is just the tip of the iceberg and an 
instance of the gravity of violations.  
Based on the findings of the independent investigation, corruption of 
doping control officers, cooperation of medical personnel with coaches 
to make them aware of washing periods, failing to comply with WADA 
rules regarding the rapid enforcement of athletes biological passport, 
controlling WADA accredited laboratory to cover up the doping cases,86 
sample swapping, bottle cap removing, and when all other efforts failed, 
disappearing positive results, are all confirmed efforts to help Russian 
athletes win more medals in international tournaments.87 Reporting the 
positive or adverse analytical findings as negative in the Anti-Doping 
Administration & Management System was one of the responsibilities of  
the conductors of the doping program.88 Furthermore, reporting the 
positive samples along with the identity of the athletes to the Russian 
Deputy Ministry of Sport was a breach of the WADA International 
Standard for Laboratories.89  
Additionally, State-sponsored doping, having a treaty ratified against 
the practice, also contradicts some of the fundamental principles of 
international law, including pact sunt servanda and good faith as 
  
 81. Commentary, supra note 30, art. 12, para. 2. 
 82. First Report, supra note 2, at 28. 
 83. See id. at 31–42 (this methodology was designed to guarantee that if all other 
efforts camouflaging the doping violations failed, then the laboratory would cover up the 
violation).  
 84. See infra Part II.A.  
 85. Second Report, supra note 2, at 19. 
 86. First Report, supra note 1, at 8–9. 
 87. Id. at 9–12. 
 88. Id. at 34. 
 89. Id. at 11. 
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considered by Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties.90 Although, “good 
faith requires conduct which is objectively compatible with meaning, 
object and purpose,”91 nevertheless Russia failed to achieve the 
Convention’s goals.   
The totality of the circumstances in this case defeats the object and 
purpose of the UNESCO convention and the WADA Code. Russia’s 
doping program, not only ignores the plain commitments of the 
Convention, but also the spirit of the laws.92 This type of non-compliance 
with treaty-based obligations, involves international responsibility.93 
IV. ATTRIBUTION OF THE CONDUCT  
Once the international wrongful act of Russia is established, the final 
factor in finding responsibility would be if the conduct was attributable 
to the State or not.  The issue of attributing conduct to a particular State 
is a controversial subject in the context of international law, usually 
raising many discussions, particularly when States are acting through 
proxies.94   
The question of attribution primarily concerns the acts of State 
organs95 and acts that have been performed under the direction and 
control of the State. The Russian State-sponsored doping case is an 
  
 90. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 26, May 23, 1969, 331 
U.N.T.S. 1155.  
 91. Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, State Responsibility and the ‘Good Faith’ Obligation 
in International Law, in 7 ISSUES OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY BEFORE INTERNATIONAL 
JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS 89, 92 (Malgosia Fitzmaurice et al. eds., Hart Publishing 2004). 
 92. Id. at 89–92. 
 93. Commentary, supra note 30, art. 1, para. 2; See also Interpretation of Peace 
Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania (Second Phase), Advisory Opinion, 1950 
I.C.J. Rep. 221, 228 (July 18).  
 94. In that case, the effective and overall control theories are not at stake, while 
the International Court of Justice defends the effective control test in its case law. See 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 
1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 115 (June 27); See also Application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & 
Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. Rep. 43, ¶ 400 (Feb. 26); See also Olivier De 
Frouville, Attribution of Conduct to the State: Private Individuals, in THE LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 257, 265–271 (James Crawford et al. eds., 2010). 
 95. Draft, supra note 25, art. 4.  
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example of the former.96 However, in one aspect, the situation comes 
close to the provisions of Article 8 of the Draft, concerning the direction 
and control of a private or non-governmental entity that meets the 
requirements of effective control theory in all aspects.97 However, 
considering the scale of direct governmental involvement, the latter is of 
less significance in this article.98 
Attaching a wrongful act to the Russian State in this case is not as 
complicated as the case of Corfu Channel,99 in which the disputed 
conduct was allegedly committed by unknown persons and 
individuals.100 Nor does it have the complexities of cases like Military 
Activities in Nicaragua or Application of the Convention of Genocide, 
which involved the controversial application of control theories in 
international law.101 In fact, the level of direct governmental 
involvement—and therefore acts of State organs—in this systematic 
State-run doping program was a surprise to the investigation team.102 
The concept of a State organ under international law, the principle of 
unity of a State, and the potential knowledge of the officials are 
  
 96. See infra Part III.A.  
 97. Draft, supra note 25, art. 8. 
 98. See generally First Report, supra note 1, at 1. The report finds it surprising 
that the “extent of State oversight and directed control of the Moscow Laboratory in 
processing and covering up urine samples.” Id. at 6. In theory, the Moscow Laboratory is 
an entity completely independent from the Ministry of Sport, which has met the WADA 
requirements. Id. at 56.  However, “the laboratory personnel were not permitted to act 
independently of any instructions that were funneled down to them from the [Ministry of 
Sport]. The Moscow Laboratory was effectively caught up in the jaws of a vice. It was a 
key player in the successful operation of a State imposed and rigorously controlled 
program, which was overall managed and dictated by the [Ministry of Sport].” Id. at 29. 
The Moscow Laboratory “was carrying out the order given to it by the Deputy Minister 
of Sport.” Id. at 35. 
 99. See François Rigaux, International Responsibility and the Principle of 
Causality, in INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TODAY: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF OSCAR 
SCHACHTER 83–85 (Maurizio Ragazzi ed., 2005).  
 100. The Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 244, 248 
(Dec. 15).  
 101. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 115 (June 27); See also Application of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. 
v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. Rep. 43, ¶ 400 (Feb. 26).  
 102. First Report, supra note 1, at 6. 
354 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 27.2
  
conducive in setting up the foundations for attributing the responsibility 
to Russia in the case of its State-run doping program.  
A. State Organs 
Article 4(1) of the Draft says: 
The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State 
under international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, 
executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever position it holds in 
the organization of the State, and whatever its character as an organ of 
the central government or of a territorial unit of the State.
103
 
Thus, the primary and simple assumption for attributing a conduct to a 
State is the acts of the different organs of a government.104   
A State act is established when State officials are involved in the 
wrongful conduct.  Individuals acting as representatives or agents on 
behalf of the State is the only form of State act.105 Therefore, human 
involvement is a requirement for realization of an act of the State.106 
For the purpose of attribution, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
has applied lower standards in more difficult situations where there were 
no State organs involved in the wrongful act. For example, in the case of 
United States Diplomatic Staff in Tehran, the Court held that verbal 
adoption and approval by State organs of the acts that could not legally 
be attributed to the State107 could translate them into State act.108 This low 
threshold helps in understanding attribution when conduct is carried out 
by State organs.   
The command structure of the State-run doping program and the links 
between individuals and governmental positions have been described in 
  
 103. Draft, supra note 25, art. 4(1).   
 104. Commentary, supra note 30, art. 4, para. 3; See Luigi Condorelli & Claus 
Kress, The Rules of Attribution: General Considerations, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 221, 229 (James Crawford et al. eds., 2010). 
 105. German Settlers in Poland, Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 6, at 
22 (Sept. 10). 
 106. Commentary, supra note 30, art. 2, para. 5.  
 107. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 
Judgement, 1980 Rep. 3, ¶ 61, Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. Rep. 45 (May 24).  
 108. See generally id. ¶¶ 71–75. 
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detail by the Independent Report.109  Accordingly, the Ministry of Sport 
is the center of all sport activities in Russia that use the federal budget.110 
The Minister conducts and supervises all aspects of sports and is 
governed by Russian Constitution and Russian Federal Law on Physical 
Culture and Sport.111   
The report serves as proof of direct intervention and control by high-
ranking State officials which will be further discussed.112 In illustrating 
an “institutionalised, controlled and disciplined” doping program, the 
report points  to the role played by the Minister of Sport and in 
particular, the Deputy Minister, considering their “leadership and 
knowledge.”113 Based on the independent report, all evidence considers 
to be established “beyond a reasonable doubt”114 that the Russian 
Ministry of Sport had an extensive guardianship on the systematic 
doping program in the form of active involvement of some State 
organs.115 For example, the ultimate Save decision for soccer players 
rested upon the vote of the Minister of Sport, who was simultaneously 
heading the Russian Football Federation.116 There are still allegations that 
even the Russian president was aware of the program and confirmed it.117 
The Deputy Minister of Sport ordered whether a case should be 
covered up or reported.118 He was the one who, in a public capacity as the 
representative of the government, was notified of all positive samples 
and decided who should be protected under the cover-up program.119 The 
Deputy Minister, reporting to the Minister, was the captain of the Sochi 
doping scheme120 and the one who initiated and supervised the first stage 
  
 109. First Report, supra note 1, at 52–56. 
 110. See Structure, MINISTRY OF SPORT OF THE RUSSIAN FED’N, 
https://www.minsport.gov.ru/en/ministry/structure/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2019).  
 111. Schmid Report, supra note 3, at 6. 
 112. See infra Part III.C. 
 113. Second Report, supra note 2, at 63. 
 114. First Report, supra note 1, at 31. 
 115. Id. at 86. 
 116. Id. at 38. 
 117. Putin ‘Must Have Known’ Of State-Sponsored Doping, Whistle-Blower Says, 
RADIO FREE EUROPE RADIO LIBERTY (Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-putin-
knew-olympics-state-doping-rodchenkov-whistle-blower/29005175.html.  
 118. First Report, supra note 1, at 11. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 63. 
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of the sample swapping process.121 The Deputy Minister was appointed 
directly by the executive order of the Russian Prime Minister122 and was 
representing the State in performing his central role in coordinating the 
doping program.123 
Officials from subdivisions of the Russian Ministry of Sport, such as 
Center of Sports Preparation of National Teams of Russia (CSP), were 
also participating in this cycle.124 The CSP and the Russian Federal 
Research Center of Physical Culture and Sports (VNIIFK) are both 
government funded entities and subdivisions of Ministry of Sport.125 For 
example, a steroid cocktail with a very short washing period was 
delivered to different Russian sport federations by a CSP employee.126 
Under direct supervision of the Russian President, the Federal 
Security Service (FSB), as a federal executive body, deals with various 
issues from national security and information security to perform deferral 
security functions.127 The FSB engaged in the doping process, especially 
in arranging and carrying out128 the sample swapping and creating a bank 
of clean urine samples129 that were key executive portions of the Russian 
doping program. Its agents, called “magicians,”130 worked through an 
operation center under the name of a sleeping room on the fourth floor of 
the Sochi Laboratory.131 The magicians, masked under the name of a 
plumbing employee, could sneak into the Laboratory132 to perform the 
critical part of the scheme—namely, opening the B samples.133 
The key component of the sample swapping method—which involved 
removing the caps of the sample bottles—was the innovation of FSB.134  
  
 121. Second Report, supra note 2, at 82. 
 122. First Report, supra note 1, at 10. 
 123. Id. at 11. 
 124. Id. at 13. 
 125. Schmid Report, supra note 3, at 7. 
 126. First Report, supra note 1, at 49–50. 
 127. See Federal Security Service, RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT (last visited Nov. 16, 
2018), http://government.ru/en/department/113/.  
 128. First Report, supra note 1, at 57. 
 129. Id. at 13. 
 130. Id. at 43. 
 131. Id. at 58. 
 132. Id. at 58. 
 133. Id. at 63. 
 134. Id. at 12. 
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The FSB operations extended beyond these to include surveillance of 
WADA employees to prevent their sample swapping agents from being 
caught if other employees unexpectedly came back to work.135 
Another important issue in the attribution debate is whether Russian 
officials were acting beyond the scope of their responsibilities in this 
case or not. Acting beyond the scope of powers, by officials at any level 
of the government, cannot be a justification for denying responsibility.136  
The commentary on the Draft Articles says, “[n]o doubt lower level 
officials may have a more restricted scope of activity and they may not 
be able to make final decisions. But conduct carried out by them in their 
official capacity is nonetheless attributable to the State for the purposes 
of article 4.”137 Therefore, even if the Russian authorities were going 
beyond their official powers, the State will be held responsible for their 
wrongful acts. 
Two more instrumental principles in the debate on attribution are the 
principle of unity of State and the issue of knowledge. The latter was 
referred to by Russian officials in order to exonerate the Russian 
government from any connection with the scandal.138 
B. Unity of State  
The unity of State is a “well-established rule, one of the cornerstones 
of the law of State responsibility.”139 For the purpose of international 
responsibility, a State is a single entity,140 regardless of the national 
structures and subdivisions that governments might use as a justification 
  
 135. Id. at 58. 
 136. Commentary, supra note 30, ch. II, para. 6. 
 137. Id. art. 4, para. 7; The notion of responsibility, even in case of excess 
function, complies with Article 91 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions 
of 12 August, 1949 and general principles of international law. See generally id. 
 138. See, e.g., Andy Brown, Russia’s National Anti-Doping Plan denies 
institutional doping, SPORTS INTEGRITY INITIATIVE (May 30, 2017), 
http://www.sportsintegrityinitiative.com/russias-national-anti-doping-plan-denies-
institutional-doping/ (denying systematic doping and any fault on behalf of the Russian 
Government). 
 139. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. Rep. 
43, ¶ 385 (Feb. 26).  
 140. Commentary, supra note 30, art. 2, para. 6. 
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to escape responsibility.141 In other words, in assessing State conduct, the 
principle of the separation of powers is irrelevant. With these boundaries 
fading, when any State organ acts in administering its public power—
whether legislative, executive or judicial—it is the State that acting.142 
Unlike municipal law, “international law permits one to consider that 
any institution which fulfills one of the traditional functions of the State, 
even if such functions have been privatized, should be considered as an 
organ of the State.”143 According to the Draft Articles’ commentary, 
“there is no category of organs specially designated for the commission 
of internationally wrongful acts, and virtually any State organ may be the 
author of such an act.”144 The Draft says:   
The State cannot take refuge behind the notion that, according to the 
provisions of its internal law or to instructions which may have been 
given to its organs or agents, their actions or omissions ought not to 
have occurred or ought to have taken a different form. This is so even 
where the organ or entity in question has overtly committed unlawful 
acts under the cover of its official status or has manifestly exceeded its 
competence.
145
 
Thus, any internal divisions concerning the organs that were involved 
in the Russian doping program are irrelevant in dissociating the State 
from its international wrongful acts. 
C. Knowledge, Fault and Scope of Powers 
Russian officials are grappling with denying any kind of connection 
with the doping program.146 While admitting the existence of doping 
  
 141. Id. ch. II, para. 7. 
 142. Id. art. 4, para. 6; See also Draft, supra note 25, art. 4(1). 
 143. Brigitte Stern, The Elements of an International Wrongful Act, in THE LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 193, 204 (James Crawford et al. eds., 2010). 
 144. Commentary, supra note 30, art. 4, para. 5. 
 145. Id. art. 7, para. 2. 
 146. See Martha Kelner, Vitaly Mutko claims there is ‘no proof’ of systematic 
doping in Russia, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 1, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2017/dec/01/vitaly-mutko-claims-there-is-no-proof-
of-systematic-doping-russia-world-cup-draw.  
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among Russian athletes,147 they were concentrated on denying State guilt 
in the doping cover-up efforts.148 This raises the prospect of one of the 
most instrumental concepts of the law of international responsibility: the 
absence of fault.149 
The struggle to deny knowledge and subsequent fault on behalf of 
Russia is likely irrelevant in denying the international responsibility 
resulting from the doping program since fault is not a requirement for 
establishing the international wrongful act.150 Brownlie clarifies this 
concept in the best way: “The effectiveness of international duties would 
be much reduced if the complainant State had to prove some level of 
knowledge or intention at a high level of government in respect of the 
acts or omissions of subordinate officials.”151 
The wording of the “Schmid commission” report minimizes the 
governmental involvement in the program.152 However, Article 4 of the 
draft and the commentary also clarifies that “any distinction made at the 
level of principle between the acts of ‘superior’ and ‘subordinate’ 
officials” triggers the State act.153 This is expressed in the phrase 
“whatever position it holds in the organization of the State” in Article 4 
of the draft.154 
  
 147. Nathan Hodge, Vladimir Putin admits ‘instances of doping’ in Russian 
athletes, CNN (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/30/sport/vladimir-putin-
russia-winter-olympics-doping/index.html.  
 148. Zhou Xin, Russia denies state-sponsored doping scheme alleged by WADA 
report, XINHUA (Nov. 8, 2017), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-
11/08/c_136737570.htm.  
 149. Commentary, supra note 30, art 2, paras. 3, 10. 
 150. Id. para. 10. 
 151. Ian Brownlie, State Responsibility and the International Court of Justice, in 7 
ISSUES OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY before INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS 11, 12 
(Malgosia Fitzmaurice et al. eds., Hart Publishing 2004). 
 152. See, e.g., Schmid Report, supra note 3, at 13 (where it states that most 
communications were with “people from other Russian entities under the responsibility 
of the Ministry of Sport,” as well as the part that mentions the “Save” decisions, which 
the First Report said the Minister was taking the final decision). Id. at 14 (which 
exonerates the Minister from any knowledge based on lack of evidence).  
 153. Commentary, supra note 30, art. 4, cmt. 7; See also Draft, supra note 25, art. 
4.  
 154. Draft, supra note 25, art. 4(1).  
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The fundamental factor here is the State organ acting in its public 
capacity. If the organ or individual155 is acting in its official capacity, 
even if the acts are beyond his authority, they are attributable to the 
government.156 The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal did take note of 
this fact and furthered the understanding by asking whether the conduct 
has been “carried out by persons cloaked with governmental 
authority.”157 
The authorities in this case were not acting in their private capacity, 
and their tasks regarding the anti-doping policies were a key part of their 
official responsibilities.158 The use of the official email of Ministry of 
Sport as a means of communication with the Laboratory connected with 
the “Disappearing Positive Methodology” is also proof of their public 
function.159 
One final element in supporting this argument is that despite the fact 
that knowledge and fault are not required to set in motion international 
responsibility, should they exist, they can build a bridge to connect an act 
to a State.160 Some operations cannot be hidden from the governmental 
custody because of their scale.161 This therefore infers a level of 
knowledge on the part of officials.162   
The exclusive control of a State inside its frontiers instructs that 
nothing, especially on an extensive scale, can happen without 
government knowledge.163 The presumption of official and public 
conduct exists when the wrongful acts are part of a “systematic or 
  
 155. Id. art. 4(2). 
 156. Id. art. 7. 
 157. Petrolane Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 518-131-2, 27 Iran-U.S.C.T.R. 
64, ¶ 83, Tribunal Decision (Aug. 14, 1991); See also Commentary, supra note 30, art. 4, 
para. 13. 
 158. See Commentary, supra note 30, art. 4, para. 13. 
 159. First Report, supra note 1, at 32, 33. 
 160. See Commentary, supra note 30, art. 16, para. 4 (Article 16 of the 
Commentary considers a situation where knowledge is the element for identifying 
responsibility of States).  
 161. Schmid Report, supra note 3, at 14 (“Even though these EDP do not include 
any messages sent directly by the Vice-Minister, it is impossible to conclude that he was 
not aware of the system in place.”).  
 162. The Corfu Channel Case (Merits), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 17–23 (Apr. 
9).  
 163. Id. at 18. 
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recurrent” plan that indicates knowledge on behalf of the State.164 The 
scale of the program implies a high level of coordination and 
premeditated engineering with the involvement of individuals from 
several governmental entities.165 
The continuing change of methods in the cover-up efforts designated 
for each tournament, depending on the level of presence by international 
observers, shows a systematic pattern of putting together inventive 
approaches that could use all necessary organs in any moment to change 
the approaches and keep the doping program running.166 This kind of 
flexibility in such a high-profile operation cannot be imagined in the 
absence of governmental control and direction. The regular practice or 
pattern of conduct that has been proven through investigations in the 
Russian doping case implies intent and knowledge.   
D. Final Comments on Attribution 
The principle of unity of State, along with other key arguments, 
together attribute responsibility to Russia for the doping scandal.167 
Furthermore, accepting responsibility in the absence of fault refutes all 
justifications for separating the Russian government from the doping 
program.168 The process of fact finding and checking the compliance of 
the documents against allegations was double-investigated by the Schmid 
Commission with the help of the University of Lausanne School of 
Criminal Justice and the outcome corroborated the findings of the 
independent commission.169 
  
 164. Commentary, supra note 30, art. 7, para. 8. 
 165. See First Report, supra note 1, at 62–63 (declaring that the planning of the 
Sochi scheme started in 2010 after a poor performance by Russian athletes in the 
Vancouver Games).  
 166. See id. at 9–17, 61, 76 (describing the changing methods of Disappearing 
Positive Methodology at IAAF World Championships to sample swapping during 2014 
Sochi games).  
 167. See Djamchid Momtaz, Attribution of Conduct to the State: State Organs and 
Entities Empowered to Exercise Elements of Governmental Authority, in THE LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 237, 246 (James Crawford et al. eds., 2010) (for further 
analysis about the attribution of the conducts of State organs).  
 168. See infra Part III.C. 
 169. Schmid Report, supra note 3, at 5, 24.  
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Russian officials have admitted wrongful conduct by individuals from 
Russian institutions in violation of Russia international obligations170: 
public officials’ involvement in systematic doping was confirmed by 
Schmid report,171
 
despite the change in language of independent 
commission from the first report to the second one.172 The Schmid 
commission report corroborates the conclusion that the Russian 
government is responsible because of failure to respect its international 
obligations and having a State doping program173: 
The picture that emerges from all of the foregoing is an intertwined 
network of State involvement through the [Ministry of Sport] and the 
FSB in the operations of both the Moscow and Sochi Laboratories. The 
FSB was woven into the fabric of the Laboratory operations and the 
[Ministry of Sport] was directing the operational results of the 
Laboratories.
174
 
Thus, it is apparent that any involvement by individuals from the 
Ministry of Sport, CSP, VNIIFK, and FSB is a State act from the 
international law perspective, whether they were on higher or lower 
layers of the governmental command structure or acting beyond the 
scope of their powers. 
V. COMPENSATION 
Obligations and rights are two inevitable sides of a coin. Every 
obligation encompasses a right to be respected.175 Once responsibility is 
established following the infringement of a right, reparation should be 
made to those who have suffered injury as the result of wrongful 
conduct.176  Leaving violated rights unaddressed would undermine the 
  
 170. Id. at 24. 
 171. Id. at 25. 
 172. Id. at 26. 
 173. Id. 
 174. First Report, supra note 1, at 60. 
 175. Commentary, supra note 30, art. 2, para. 8. 
 176. Id. art. 31, para 1. 
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concept of international justice and is a blow to the efforts of building 
trust in international law and international institutions.177 
The draft discusses the duty on behalf of the responsible State to make 
full reparation,178 which ranges from restitution to compensation and 
satisfaction or a combination of all these options.179 The question, 
therefore, is what is the appropriate form of reparation in the case of 
State-sponsored doping?  
In situations where restitution is inaccessible, the remaining methods 
of reparation are inevitably required.180 Like many other disputes,181 the 
nature of Sport activities preclude restoration as the primary means of 
reparation.182 An athlete who is the victim of a dirty act of cheating in the 
form of a doping violation is stripped of not only his or her title, but also 
the delight of some matchless moments in the life of a human being. 
Athletes being welcomed by thousands of fans—even leaders of a 
nation183—is now a burned dream, time has erased the excitement of the 
competition moment.  In other words, a fundamental change in 
situation184 exists.  Restitution in this case is materially impossible and 
disproportionate to the harm done.185 Restoring the gold medal to the 
clean athlete lacks the huge media coverage and the attention of billions 
of people,186 as nobody can travel back in the time. Therefore, the 
  
 177. CHRISTINE EVANS, THE RIGHT TO REPARATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR 
VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICT 233 (Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
 178. Draft, supra note 25, art. 31(1). 
 179. Id. art. 34. 
 180. See Commentary, supra note 30, art. 35, para. 4. 
 181. See KOLB, supra note 17, at 155. 
 182. See Commentary, supra note 30, art. 35, para. 4. 
 183. See Tony Fraser, Walcott receives hero’s welcome in Trinidad, BOSTON.COM 
(Aug. 13, 2012), 
http://archive.boston.com/sports/other_sports/articles/2012/08/13/walcott_receives_heros
_welcome_in_trinidad/.  
 184. See Commentary, supra note 30, art. 35(4). 
 185. BORZU SABAHI, COMPENSATION AND RESTITUTION IN INVESTOR-STATE 
ARBITRATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 86–90 (John H. Jackson ed., Oxford University 
Press 2011). 
 186. See How Do We Know That Rio 2016 Was A Success, INT’L OLYMPICS 
COMMITTEE (Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.olympic.org/news/how-do-we-know-that-rio-
2016-was-a-success (for example, 3.6 billion people—about half the population of the 
world—watched coverage of the 2016 Rio Olympics, which consisted of 350,000 hours 
of television and digital coverage). See also 2014 FIFA World Cup reached 3.2 Billion 
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possibility of full reparation,187 in the form of restitution in the case of 
State-sponsored doping or other wrongful conducts with regard to 
international sport obligations, is ruled out.  
However, full reparation188 in sports can be assumed in the framework 
of the principle of proportionality.189 In this context, first, cessation is the 
primary automatic duty of the violating State190; hence, complete 
reparation includes measures to ensure the non-repetition of the wrongful 
conduct.191 Second, are sanctions, part of the reparation in doping cases is 
the reaction by sport governing bodies in suspending the national 
federations of the responsible State,192 or like IOC, in stripping the 
cheating athletes from their titles and awarding the medals to the 
following clean athletes.193 The waiver of “presumption of innocence” 
for Russian athletes before the 2016 Rio Games,194 the ban on all Russian 
  
viewers, one billion watched final, FIFA (Dec. 16, 2015), 
http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/news/y=2015/m=12/news=2014-fifa-world-cuptm-
reached-3-2-billion-viewers-one-billion-watched--2745519.html (compared to the 2014 
FIFA World Cup, which was watched by 3.2 billion people around the world).  
 187. See Draft, supra note 25, art. 31, cmt. 3 (“In other words, the responsible 
State must endeavor to ‘wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish 
the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been 
committed.’”).  
 188. See, e.g., Factory at Chorzow (Claim for Indemnity) (The Merits) (Germ. V. 
Pol.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 4, 20 (Sept. 13).  
 189. See Draft, supra note 25, art. 34, cmt. 5. 
 190. KOLB, supra note 17, at 149. 
 191. See Julio Barboza, Legal injury: The Tip of the Iceberg in the Law of State 
Responsibility, in INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TODAY: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF OSCAR 
SCHACHTER 7, 16 (Maurizio Ragazzi ed., 2005). 
 192. IAAF Provisionally Suspends Russian Member Federation ARAF, INT’L 
ASS’N OF ATHLETICS FED’N (Nov. 13, 2015), https://www.iaaf.org/news/press-
release/iaaf-araf-suspended.  
 193. See IOC DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION, DECISION REGARDING ILYA ILIN 8 
(2016), 
https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/IOC/Who-We-
Are/Commissions/Disciplinary-Commission/BRT-III-013-Decision-of-the-Disciplinary-
Commission-Ilya-ILIN.pdf#_ga=2.133748110.1493824571.1545022043-
900081857.1545022043; See also WADA Code, supra note 49, art. 9 (the article reads: 
“An anti-doping rule violation in Individual Sports in connection with an In-Competition 
test automatically leads to Disqualification of the result obtained in that Competition with 
all resulting Consequences, including forfeiture of any medals, points and prizes.”).  
 194. Schmid Report, supra note 3, at 4. 
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athletes to participate in the following tournament,195 and the prohibition 
in having the Russian flag or Russian anthem196 all can be a part of the 
full reparation.197 
However, the distinction between “sanction” and “reparation” implies 
that simply banning the Russian athletes is not enough.198 Restoring 
justice and bringing satisfaction to the injured subject is a necessity.199
 
Compensation, is the most frequently used form of reparation among all 
other frameworks.200 Compensation is an automatic result of 
responsibility.201  
The Draft provides that: “1. The State responsible for an 
internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to compensate for the 
damage caused thereby, insofar as such damage is not made good by 
restitution. 2. The compensation shall cover any financially assessable 
damage including loss of profits insofar as it is established.”202 
Compensation is a monetary remedy aimed at indemnifying the damages 
and losses suffered by a State or individual as the result of a violation of 
international obligations.203 Therefore, compensation in the form of 
financial payments as the first available option after restitution is the 
appropriate reparation method for victims of State-sponsored doping. 
Moreover, the possibility of punitive damages against the violating State 
in these circumstances cannot be ruled out.204 
  
 195. Decision of the IOC Executive Board Concerning the Participation of 
Russian Athletes in the Olympic Games Rio 2016, INT’L OLYMPICS COMMITTEE (Jul. 24, 
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 196. Christopher Clarey, Russian Doping: The Case of Barring Russia Entirely, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/04/sports/olympics/russia-
doping-olympics.html.  
 197. See Convention Parties Conference, supra note 79, para. 108 (however these 
kinds of collective punishments go against the general principles of law).  
 198. See Barboza, supra note 191, at 10. 
 199. Id.  
 200. See generally Draft, supra note 25, art. 36, para 2. 
 201. The Corfu Channel Case (Merits), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 23–24 (Apr. 
9). 
 202. Draft, supra note 25, art. 36.  
 203. Id.  
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The following analysis lays the foundations to accept that athletes 
who lost a medal during the competition as the result of a doping 
violation fueled by State actions are the main individual beneficiaries of 
the compensation process. Moreover, the distinction between material 
and moral damages can be something that properly fits the boundaries of 
sport doping violations. 
A. Individual Compensation 
The nature of doping regulations and the principle of remedies in 
international human rights warrants a finding that clean athletes, as the 
victims of doping violations, should be the subject of compensation. 
Either the State or individuals if damaged can be the subject of 
compensation.205 Individuals have been increasingly recognized as the 
primary beneficiaries of reparation issues in international law.206 In the 
words of the Judge Cançado Trindade, “the subject of the corresponding 
right to reparation is a human being.”207 
Modern doctrines in international law acknowledge that individuals 
are right holders and “bearers of obligations” as subjects of international 
law,208 and therefore are logically entitled to reparations.209 The Draft 
Articles cover the damage to nationals of a State as the financially 
assessable damages under the law of international State responsibility.210 
  
 205. Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 
Rep. 347, ¶ 29 (June 19) (Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade). 
 206. EVANS, supra note 177, at 28–31. 
 207. Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo, 2012 I.C.J. at 349, ¶ 5. 
 208. Id. at 351–52, ¶¶ 11–12. 
 209. EVANS, supra note 177, at 30; See also U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the 
International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, 
151 n.217 (Jan. 25, 2005) (“The emergence of human rights under international law has 
altered the traditional State responsibility concept, which focused on the State as the 
medium of compensation. The integration of human rights into State responsibility has 
removed the procedural limitation that victims of war could seek compensation only 
through their own Governments and has extended the right to compensation to both 
nationals and aliens. There is a strong tendency towards providing compensation not only 
to States but also to individuals based on State responsibility.”). 
 210. Draft, supra note 25, art. 36. 
2019] International Responsibility of States 367
  
For this purpose, the methods of reparation should be tailored down to 
meet the athlete’s needs, difficulties and endeavors 211 to respect the 
human “condition of spiritual being”212:  
Reparations for human rights breaches are, in fact, directly and 
ineluctably linked to the condition of the victims and their next of kin, 
who occupy in it a central position herein. Reparations are to be 
constantly reassessed as from the perspective of the integrality of the 
personality of the victims themselves, bearing in mind the fulfillment of 
their aspirations as human beings and the restoration of their dignity.
213
 
Compensation for personal injury has been considered by courts and 
tribunals,214 while individuals as well as States have been subject to 
compensation and remedies in the jurisprudence of the ICJ215 and other 
human rights bodies such as the European Court of Human Rights216 and 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.217 The United Nations 
Compensation Commission is another forum with a prehistory of 
evaluating individual damages in different cases.218   
Accordingly, it is a well-established principle that individuals as 
human beings—not only in case of international human rights or 
  
 211. Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo, 2012 I.C.J. at 367, ¶ 51. 
 212. Id. at 367, ¶ 52. 
 213. Id. at 368, ¶ 54. 
 214. See Commentary, supra note 30, art. 36, para. 17. 
 215. See Malcom Shaw, The International Court, Responsibility and Remedies, in 
7 ISSUES OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY BEFORE INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS 19, 30 
(Malgosia Fitzmaurice et al. eds., Hart Publishing 2004) (“The Court may also interpret a 
relevant international legal provision so that individual rights as well as State’s rights are 
recognised in a particular case, thus opening the door to a claim for damages on behalf of 
the former by the national State where there has been a breach of such rights.”); See also 
Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo, 2012 I.C.J. at 350, ¶ 9 (“The fact that the mechanism for 
dispute-settlement by the ICJ is, as disclosed by its interna corporis, an inter-State one, 
does not mean that the Court’s findings and its corresponding reasoning, ought to be 
invariably limited to a strict inter-State approach. Not at all; in their contents, cases vary 
considerably, and, throughout the last decades, some of them have directly concerned the 
condition of individuals.”).  
 216. See SHELTON, supra note 15, 205–19; See also Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo, 
2012 I.C.J. at 374–76, ¶¶ 71–73. 
 217. See SHELTON, supra note 15, 224–32; See also Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo, 
2012 I.C.J. at 372–74, ¶¶ 65–70.  
 218. See EVANS, supra note 177, 139–44. 
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international humanitarian law breaches, but also in other forms of 
violation of international law rules—deserve compensation.219 This 
“victim-oriented perspective,”220 implies that since violation of 
international doping standards is a violation of international law 
provisions,221 then its individual victims are qualified for reparations.222 
The type of wrongful acts under international law that cause injury to 
aliens are conceptually and practically the “closest to modern 
international human rights violations.”223 State-sponsored doping is 
similar to human rights cases due to the fact that individuals are the 
primary objects and victims of the wrongful conduct and are the subject 
of protection by international legal standards.224   
Like human rights treaties, sportive international documents such as 
the UNESCO Convention or WADA Code, formulate protections for 
individual athletes. Similar to human rights treaties context, the 
UNESCO Convention “confer[s] rights upon individuals, [and] 
impose[s] obligations upon States.”225 Provisions of the Convention are 
inherently “positive obligation[s],”226 which brings it closer to the 
structure of human rights treaties. The convention refers to “existing 
international instruments relating to human rights.”227 Moreover, 
problems such as the health risk of using performance-enhancing drugs 
and eliminating cheating in order to respect fair play and equality are 
some of the concerns addressed by the Convention.228 In particular, the 
health of individuals who participated in the sport activities was 
highlighted by the Convention.229 
  
 219. See Commentary, supra note 30, art. 33, para. 3. 
 220. G.A. Res. 60/147, annex, at 4 (Mar. 21, 2006). 
 221. See supra Part II. 
 222. G.A. Res. 60/147, annex, at 7–9, paras. 15–23 (Mar. 21, 2006).  
 223. See SHELTON, supra note 15, at 35. 
 224. See KOLB, supra note 17, at 210. 
 225. James Crawford, The System of International Responsibility, in THE LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 17, 17 (James Crawford et al. eds., 2010). 
 226. Benedetto Conforti, Exploring the Strasbourg Case-Law: Reflections on State 
responsibility for the Breach of Positive Obligations, in 7 ISSUES OF STATE 
RESPONSIBILITY BEFORE INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS 129, 129 (Malgosia 
Fitzmaurice et al. eds., Hart Publishing 2004). 
 227. Convention, supra note 48, at 1.  
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. art. 3(b). 
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The WADA Code starts with this key assumption: “The purposes of 
the World Anti-Doping Code and the World Anti-Doping Program 
which supports it are: [t]o protect the Athletes’ fundamental right to 
participate in doping-free sport and thus promote health, fairness and 
equality for Athletes worldwide.”230 Athletes in the case of State-
sponsored doping are victims of organized crime231 and abuses of 
power,232 yet are widely neglected. They have been unjustly subjected to 
damage,233 emotional suffering, and economic loss,234 and are therefore 
entitled to be compensated. After all, law needs innovation based on the 
new requirements that emerge from various horizons.235  
International law is unceasingly evolving with the changing political 
and moral landscape.236 The law of State responsibility itself is a 
response to the necessities of the modern world to avoid hiding behind 
static dogmas.237 In fact, these are human beings—individual, not  
States—who have to suffer when years of hard training and investing for 
one goal has been swiped out by a cheater who was supported by 
systematic efforts of a government.238 Individuals who have decided to 
be professional clean athletes need protection and should enjoy non-
interference to their rights as a sign of respect “for the inherent dignity of 
all persons.”239  
The possibility of raising direct claims by individuals was considered 
by Garcia Amador, the ILC Special Rapporteur, but was not accepted by 
  
 230. WADA code, supra note 49, at 11. 
 231. Maureen Weston, The Regulation of Doping in U.S. and International Sports, 
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN SPORTS LAW 83, 102–03 (Michael A. McCann 
ed., 2018). 
 232. See generally G.A. Res. 40/34 (Nov. 29, 1985).  
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. annex, ¶ 1. 
 235. See Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo), Judgment, 2012 
I.C.J. Rep. 347, ¶ 52 (June 19) (Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade).  
 236. James Crawford & Jeremy Watkins, International Responsibility, in THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 283, 298 (Samantha Besson et al. eds., 2010). 
 237. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece intervening), 
Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. Rep. 99, 287, ¶ 301 (Feb. 3) (Cançado Trindade, J., dissenting). 
 238. Id. at 269, ¶ 252; See also Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo, 2012 I.C.J. at 365, ¶¶ 
47–48.  
 239. SHELTON, supra note 15, at 20. 
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the ILC at the end.240 However, diplomatic protection can be the key to 
raise a claim in front of international tribunals like the ICJ.241  The ICJ is 
a proper forum, especially if the parties to this dispute cannot reach an 
agreement on reparations.242 Based on article 36(2)(d) of the ICJ Statute, 
the Court has jurisdiction over cases that trigger questions of 
responsibility.243  
Diplomatic protection is an institution that allows States to raise 
claims on behalf of its nationals who have incurred injury as the result of 
an international wrongful act.244 However, whether diplomatic protection 
is the right of the State or the right of the individual is still a source of 
controversy.245
 
B. Material Damage  
In compensation, the primary issue is remedying actual material 
damages to property or other interests of the State and its nationals that is 
assessable in financial terms.246 Sports turned into a big industry at the 
  
 240. See Daniel Müller, The Work of García Amador on State Responsibility for 
Injury Caused to Aliens, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 69, 69–72 
(James Crawford et al. eds., 2010). 
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al. eds., 2010). 
 244. James R. Crawford, State Responsibility, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PUB. INT’L L., para. 59 (Sept. 2006), 
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 245. Alain Pellet, The ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally 
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88–89 (James Crawford et al. eds., 2010).   
 246. Commentary, supra note 30, art. 31, para. 5. 
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start of the new century.247  Although athletes may not get paid for being 
in international events, that stage is a unique chance to change their 
whole life, but only if they step up the podium.248  
In the case of athletes who have been deprived of their titles as a 
result of State-sponsored doping, compensation may cover actual 
damage, lost earnings, and profits.249 Having responsibility established, 
lost profit is a financially assessable damage,250 because at the end, 
“[r]emedies aim to place an aggrieved party in the same position as he or 
she would have been had no injury occurred.”251 
Calculating the actual material damage in a doping case is likely not a 
difficult task since there are dispositive evidences, such as official 
announcements of monetary prizes for the winning athletes252 that help to 
enlighten the aspects of the financial damage. Many countries publicly 
announce the rewards for their medalists before the games,253 which in 
some cases can be a six figure reward for a gold medal.254 The financial 
bonanza sometimes might be reinforced by private businesses, who are 
interested in bringing into sharp focus the connection between their 
  
 247. JAMES A.R. NAFZIGER, INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW 10–11, 167–175 (2d ed. 
2004). 
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products and a successful athlete,255 so the issue of endorsement deals 
and sponsorships by big brands and companies can be an enormous 
source of income for athletes.256 In addition, compensation also should 
cover the athlete support personnel and coaches if they were supposed to 
receive a money prize in the case of success. In some cases, the coaches 
are awarded better than the medalists.257 
The ICJ has considered the claim of “potential earnings” by 
claimants.258 The ICJ has declared that generally, remedying lost income 
is an appropriate form of compensation for the victims.259 The burden of 
proof here will be on athletes to provide the court or tribunal with an 
estimate of the losses they have incurred as the result of being unfairly 
deprived of their titles.260    
In calculating the financial damages to victims of State-sponsored 
doping, the subjective method or the differential method is primarily 
used to determine the financial situation of the victim in the absence of 
the international wrongful conduct.261 For this purpose, after assessing 
the financial situation of the victim had the act not occurred, the 
  
 255. See Rachel Axon, Medals Are Nice, but Sometimes Not Enough For Olympic 
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estimates are compared with the realities of the present day.262 This 
approach also applies to those who have been demoted to a lower 
ranking but still had some benefits from their achievement;263 the 
difference of the earnings for the previous ranking and the new position 
will be calculated. The date of the valuation, and not the wrongful 
conduct, is the basis of estimating the damages.264 
The next issue revolves around the outer limits of compensation plans 
as to what events and which athletes should be subjected to 
compensation. Article 14(3) of the Draft provides that: “The breach of an 
international obligation requiring a State to prevent a given event occurs 
when the event occurs and extends over the entire period during which 
the event continues and remains not in conformity with that 
obligation.”265 Therefore, the compensation can extend to all tournaments 
that have been organized during the period of time that Russian athletes 
were participating with positive doping results.266 
Estimating the damages will be a case-by-case assessment. 
Sometimes a moment of heroism by the athlete changes the history of a 
country and may meaningfully increase the chance of getting additional 
awards, like national monuments named for the athlete.267 Hence, the 
principle of equity, particularly when the appraisal is on a case-by-case 
basis, and the economic situation of the injured individual can be used as 
supplemental tools for the assessment of financial damages.268 
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C. Moral Injury 
Here, the issue is whether athletes who have suffered moral damages 
should be subjected to financial compensation as a result of the unfair 
advantage that doping provides. Moral injury is part of bringing 
satisfaction to the injured, in which “a monetary value can be put only in 
a highly approximate and notional way.”269 The person who should cope 
with the distressing feeling of the painful moments of the life is a human 
being, not a legal personality of a State or an organization.270  In some 
cases, such as grave human rights violations, the moral damage is more 
important than any other damage.271 According to the Draft, moral 
damage, like material damage, is normally financially assessable, and 
therefore covered by efforts for compensation.272 Article 31(2) of the 
Draft says: “Injury includes any damage, whether material or moral, 
caused by the internationally wrongful act of a State.”273 
The psychological trauma of wrongful conduct has been addressed by 
international courts and tribunals in the past, especially regarding human 
rights violations.274  In the compensation case Guinea v. Congo, the court 
points out that mental or moral injury are the sufferings of an entity or 
individual other than material injuries,275 and thus do not necessarily 
need evidence establishing them.276 Mental injury can include mental 
suffering, injury to feelings, humiliation, shame, degradation, loss of 
loved ones, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of companionship, loss of 
social position, or injury to credit or reputation.277   
  
 269. Commentary, supra note 30, art. 36, para 4 & art. 37, para 3. 
 270. Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 
Rep. 347, ¶ 77 (June 19) (Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade).  
 271. See id. at 376–78, ¶¶ 74–80. 
 272. Draft, supra note 25, art. 36(2); See also G.A. Res. 60/147, ¶ 20(d) (Mar. 21, 
2006). 
 273. Draft, supra note 25, art. 31(2).  
 274. See Barker, supra note 249, at 605. 
 275. Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 
Rep. 324, ¶ 18 (June 19). 
 276. Id. at 334, ¶ 21. 
 277. U.N., Reports on Int’l Arbitral Awards: Op. in Lusitania Cases, vol. VII, at 
40 (Nov. 1, 1923); Commentary, supra note 30, art. 26, para. 19; See also id. art. 31, 
para. 5. 
2019] International Responsibility of States 375
  
To be realistic, the suffering of an athlete is not comparable with 
victims of torture, genocide, or war crimes, but by the same token, 
athletes can be subject to compensation because of their mental trauma.  
The significance of psychological aspects for athletes is clarified by 
categorizing sport psychology as a distinguished area “that uses 
psychological knowledge and skills to address optimal performance and 
well-being of athletes, developmental and social aspects of sports 
participation, and systemic issues associated with sports settings and 
organizations.”278 
In this case, the Russian doping program caused both material and 
moral injury.279 Many athletes invest a huge amount of time, money, and 
exercise to make a living for their future with an Olympic title, and in 
fact, this is the attractive financial perspective of sport that raises 
challenges like doping in Sports.280 The prospect of a financially 
comfortable life is an incentive that pushes athletes beyond the 
boundaries of ordinary people to have extraordinary performances.281 
This rare opportunity that could have had the power of a Midas touch282 
for a human being was unfairly taken away from the athlete. He was not 
only robbed of his property283 by a cheater, but also of his fame, his 
social position, and more. This could inflict immense mental pressure on 
the individual. Right from the beginning, clean athletes were playing in 
an unequal field without knowing the stage has been set up to rob them 
of their dreams. Russian athletes were enabled “to compete dirty while 
enjoying certainty that their anti-doping samples would be reported 
clean.”284 
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The creativity that exists in the form of reparations in human rights 
cases285 can be considered in the sport context. The principle of equity, is 
a central tenet in evaluating the moral damages.286 Nevertheless, there are 
complications in quantifying moral injury, like duplicate damages,287 that 
should be taken into consideration. 
One last element to consider in regard to the mental trauma of the 
athletes is that after all, “money is an ill substitute” for what was lost.288 
The bitter reality is that dollars cannot compensate that unique moment 
of glory when an athlete turns into a hero and wins the hearts of millions 
of fans during the live broadcast of an exciting competition. 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
It is important to hold States responsible for reparations in cases of 
violations of individuals’ rights289 because “States are the principal 
bearers of international obligations.”290   
Sport governing bodies confirmed that the involvement of the Russian 
Ministry of Sport in the systematic doping scheme was out of the scope 
of its powers, and therefore was left to UNESCO and WADA to deal 
with it.291 In addition, years of administrative fighting with doping has 
practically failed, with retests from Beijing and London Olympics 
showing that athletes were at least ten years ahead of sport officials. 
International law framework can be a radically different approach in the 
fight against the plague of doping. This article demonstrates that it is 
better to leave the problem of State-sponsored doping in the hands of the 
law of international State responsibility.292   
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Indeed, what ultimately matters is the “realization of justice at 
national and international levels.”293 Based on the foregoing, Russia is 
responsible for its state-sponsored doping program and violating 
international obligations under the UNESCO Convention and the WADA 
code. The doping violations are attributable to Russia as the acts of State 
organs. These infringements render Russia responsible to provide 
monetary compensation for individual athletes who have been the 
victims of this systematic violation.   
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